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Introduction
"Women's lives and their bodies have been the unacknowledged casu-
alties of war for far too long."' In just the last three decades, militants-on
almost every continent-have raped hundreds of thousands of women. 2
Nevertheless, international legal bodies have brought few rapists to justice.
Since 2000, international tribunals have convicted only five men and
t David Sverdlov is a third year student at Cornell Law School.
1. Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Women's Lives and Bodies-Unrecognized Casual-
ties of War (Dec. 8, 2004).
2. Wars Overlooked Victims, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 15, 2011, at 54.
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women in Rwanda, twenty-three men in the former Yugoslavia, 3 and one
person from the Congo for using rape as a weapon of war.4 As such, rape
remains the least-condemned war crime; thousands of unpunished rapists
continue to walk free, and in some cases, on the same streets as their
victims.
5
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the smaller affili-
ates such as Boko Haram are the most recent and unpunished perpetrators
who use rape as a weapon of war.6 Since invading northern parts of Iraq
in 2014, ISIL forced at least six thousand Yazidi women into sexual slavery,
three thousand of whom remain enslaved.7 Likewise, Boko Haram has
abducted about five hundred women in Nigeria and forced at least some of
them into marriages and slave-like domestic servitude.8 But no ISIL or
Boko Haram militants have been prosecuted for using rape to commit geno-
cide, a crime against humanity, or a war crime.
It is important not to leave justice wanting and these women unrecog-
nized. To that end, international organizations must ensure legal prosecu-
tion of both ISIL and Boko Haram under either the Genocide Convention
or the non-genocidal crimes of the Rome Statute. This Note will explore
legal precedent on prosecuting rape as a weapon of war and recommend
whether it is feasible to prosecute ISIL or Boko Haram under Articles VI
and VII of the Rome Statute. To do so, this Note will rely on the precedents
established during the prosecutions of Rwandan and Yugoslavian war
criminals. Part II will provide a brief overview of ISIL, the Yazidis, and
Boko Haram's histories. Part III will provide facts on the Rwandan Hutu
treatment of female Tutsis and the Bosnian Serb treatment of Bosnian Mus-
lim women during their respective genocides and the legal precedent from
the tribunals that dealt with both events. Part IV will evaluate the known
facts regarding ISIL and Boko Haram under legal precedent and conclude
that ISIL leaders can be prosecuted for genocidal rape, but Boko Haram
leaders must be prosecuted under different crimes in the Rome Statute.
Part V provides suggestions for which militants to charge. Part VI is the
conclusion.
3. Heidi Nichols Haddad, Mobilizing the Will to Prosecute: Crimes of Rape at the
Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals, 12 HUM. RTS. REv. 109, 118 (2011).
4. Kevin Sieff, In Historic Ruling, International Court Cites Rape in War Crimes Con-
viction of Ex-Congo Official, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/world/africa/international-court-adds-rape-to-war-crimes-list-in-congo-conviction/
2016/03/21/2e7f4320-ef72-11e5-85a6-2132cf446d0a.story.html [https://perma.cc/
X9SE-RPHE].
5. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHATTERED LivEs: SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING THE RwANDAN
GENOCIDE AND ITS AFTERMATH (1996), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
1996_Rwanda_%20Shattered%20Lives.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GM7-FFMS].
6. Press Release, Fight Against Sexual Violence in Conflict Reaches "New Junc-
ture", Security Council Told (Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/
sc1862.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/5LRN-DPKK].
7. Rukmini Callimachi, Enslaving Young Girls, The Islamic State Builds a Vast System
of Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2015, at Al.
8. CAROLINE VARIN, BOKO HARAm AND THE WAR ON TERROR 78-79 (2016).
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I. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Boko Haram, and the
Yazidis
A. Brief Overview of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is a Sunni insurgent
group that controls about 65,500 square miles of Syria and Iraq and a pop-
ulation of about six million people.9 The group began almost two decades
ago not as ISIL, but rather as Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Jama'at), a Jor-
dan-based organization, founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 1999.10
Zarqawi, a former street thug, embraced Islam after his parents introduced
him to religion in an attempt to help him leave the criminal world.1 1 But
his Islam was radical, even compared to other terrorist groups such as al-
Qaeda, and he sought to imbue his organization with such ideals. His
beliefs included an extreme interpretation of the Islamic practice of excom-
municating heretical Muslims, the overthrow of the Jordanian government,
and staunch anti-American beliefs. 12 Because of his radical stance, the
group attracted little popular support, remaining small and not even on the
CIA's radar for the first few years of its existence. 1
3
Jama'at started to change from its small origins to a well-known fight-
ing group after the United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003.14 Under
Zarqawi's leadership, Jama'at was responsible for a large number of attacks
on U.S. forces. 15 The scale of its attacks gained it fame in the Middle East
and attracted the attention of Osama bin-Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda.
Prior to the Iraq War, bin-Laden wanted little to do with Jama'at because he
viewed the group as too extreme, so he limited himself to providing it with
start-up funds for a training camp.16 Once the war with American forces
broke out, bin-Laden recognized that he could not sit on the sidelines, and
risk ruining his reputation as a fighter against Western imperialism. 17 But
he had a problem: there was no al-Qaeda franchise in Iraq.18 As such, bin-
Laden could not afford to keep Jama'at out, so despite his ideological dis-
agreements with Zarqawi, bin-Laden proposed a formal alliance. 19 Jama'at
9. The Islamic State and the Crisis in Iraq and Syria in Maps, BBC (Nov. 30, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034 [https://perma.cc/U96J-
25ZC].
10. See Mapping Militant Organizations: The Islamic State, STANFORD U. (Aug. 4,
2016), http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1
[https://perma.cc/MV88-3SGM]; see also Aaron Y. Zelin, The War Between ISIS and al-
Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR EAST POL'Y 1
(2014), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_
20_Zelin.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4BU-T78S].
11. See Joby Warwick, BLACK FLAGS: THE RiSE OF ISIS 49 (2015).
12. See id. at 22-23.
13. Id. at 75-76.
14. Id. at 71.
15. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A FACE AND A NAME: CIVILIAN VICTIMS OF INSURGENT
GROUPS IN IRAQ 36 (2006), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraqlO05
.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7LE-3QBA].
16. See Zelin, supra note 10, at 2; WARwICK, supra note 11, at 75.
17. See WARVaCK, supra note 11, at 174.
18. See id.
19. See id.
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accepted the proposal and became al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). 20 The group
then merged with other Islamic insurgents in Iraq in 2006 to become the
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).21
ISI's power increased further after the Syrian rebellion against Bashar
al-Assad.22 When hostilities began, ISI sent militants into Syria, who oper-
ated as a quasi-independent network known as Jabhat al-Nusra li Ahl as-
Sham (al-Nusra).23 ISI and al-Nusra operated separately for two years,
until al-Baghdadi, ISI's new leader, called for re-unification. 24 The al-Nusra
leadership, as well as leaders of al-Qaeda, rejected the proposed re-unifica-
tion, whereas members of al-Nusra defected, re-merged with ISI, and
formed the current Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). 25 As a
result of the disagreement on the merger, ISIL disaffiliated from al-Qaeda
and became an independent organization for the first time.26 With its new-
found independence, ISIL began an immediate campaign of expansion,
conquering about ten million people and 90,800 square kilometers of Syria
and Iraq, including the major cities of Fallujah, Raqqa, and Mosul. 27 Dur-
ing this campaign, ISIL took control of the Nineveh region, which included
the town of Sinjar, where it first came into contact with the Yazidi
population.28
B. Brief Overview of the Yazidis
The Yazidis are a small group of ethnic Kurds, who number about
500,000 to 700,000 people throughout the world.29 Most of them live in
the Nineveh region of Iraq, in particular the town of Sinjar.30 Although the
exact origins of Yazidism are unknown, scholars believe that the religion
began in the twelfth century when Sufi leader Adi Ibn Musafir came to the
region and combined elements of Islam with the pre-Islamic practices of
the people living there.31 The result was Yazidism: a monotheistic religion
20. See id.
21. See Zelin, supra note 10, at 3.
22. Lucy Rodgers et al., Syria: The Story of the Conflict, BBC (Mar. 11, 2016), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868 [https://perma.cc/D4VP-LEKS].
23. Rania Abouzeid, The Jihad Next Door, POLITICO (June 23, 2014), http://www
.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/al-qaeda-iraq-syria-108214full
.html#.WAznq5MrK8o [https://perma.cc/3A64-MHNL].
24. Id.
25. What is ISIS?, BBC (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-
east-29052144 [https://perma.cc/P3CJ-M767].
26. See WARWICK, supra note 11, at 285.
27. See James Verini, Surviving the Fall of ISIS, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 16, 2016),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/10/islamic-state-isis-iraq-mosul-syria-offen-
sive [https://perma.cc/K2A3-FJRK]; see also VARIN, supra note 8.
28. See Callimachi, supra note 7, at A12.
29. See Avi Asher-Schapiro, Who are the Yazidis, the Ancient, Persecuted Religious
Minority Struggling to Survive in Iraq, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 11, 2014), http://
news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/08/140809-iraq-yazidis-minority-isil-religion-
history [https://perma.cc/MJ9Q-JXHS]; U.S. Dep't of St., Int'l Religious Freedom Rep.
for 2012 2 (2012), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2012religiousfreedom/index
.htm?year-2012&dlid=208390#wrapper [ttps://perma.cc/6GW3-HPQ5].
30. See id.
31. See GERARD RUSSELL, HEIRS TO THE FORGOTTEN KINGDOM 58 (2014).
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with elements of Zoroastrianism, Mithraism, Mathdaism, and other ele-
ments of the area's oral traditions.3 2
The persecution of the Yazidis at the hands of Islamic populations is
not new. From at least the sixteenth century, Ottoman and Kurdish author-
ities incited violence against the Yazidis out of a profound suspicion that
the Yazidis worshipped the devil and fear that the Yazidis sought to estab-
lish power.3 3 In recent times, Saddam Hussein, the former President of
Iraq, razed traditional Yazidi villages and forced the Yazidis from the sur-
rounding mountains to move to the town of Sinjar.34 The Yazidis them-
selves recount that their group has been subjected to seventy-two
persecutions since its inception.3 5 In short, ISIL's most recent attack on
the Yazidis follows a long string of attacks on the group, but the difference
now is the magnitude and the additional enslavement of women.3 6
C. Contact Between the Islamic State and the Yazidis
In August 2014, ISIL invaded the Sinjar region, and not long after,
reports of mass executions began to circulate.3 7 During these mass
murders, ISIL gave Yazidis the option of converting or being killed.38 In
one instance, five hundred Yazidis refused conversion and ISIL buried
them, some still alive, in a mass grave. 39 Another mass grave in Syria holds
the remains of hundreds of bodies from a single tribe, which is now known
to have been almost entirely exterminated.40 As of August 2016, seventy-
two mass graves containing fifteen thousand bodies have been found.4 1 As
a result of the violence, tens of thousands of Yazidis have fled north into
Kurdistan, west to Europe, or to other countries.4 2 There is little doubt
now that ISIL either wanted to expel the Yazidis- at least the men-from its
territorial confines or to exterminate them. The UN Human Rights Coun-
cil and the United States Holocaust Museum recognize these events as a
32. See Asher-Schapiro, supra note 29.
33. Emma Green, The Yazidis, A People Who Fled, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 13, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/intemationa/archive/2014/08/the-yazidis-a-peoplewho-
fled/375964 [https://perma.cc/EKP4-RTA4].
34. Asher-Schapiro, supra note 29.
35. RUSSELL, supra note 31, at 41.
36. See generally RUSSELL, supra note 31.
37. See Ahmed Rasheed, Iraq Says Islamic State Killed 500 Yazidis, Buried Some Vic-
tims Alive, REUTERs (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-
yazidis-killings-idUSKBNOGAOFF20140810 [https://perma.cc/3HZC-4TXU].
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Kareem Shaheen, Up to 15,000 ISIS Victims Buried in Mass Graves in Syria and
Iraq-Survey, THE GuARIAN (Aug. 30, 2006), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2016/aug/30/up-to-15000-bodies-may-be-buried-in-mass-graves-in-syria-and-iraq-
survey.
41. Id.
42. Raya Jalabi, Who Are the Yazidis and Why Is ISIS Hunting Them, THE Gu IADN
(Aug. 11, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/07/who-yazidi-isis-
iraq-religion-ethnicity-mountains [https://perma.cc/RT9D-B8G7].
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genocide against the Yazidis. 43
The mass sexual enslavement of Yazidi women accompanied these kill-
ings. As ISIL invaded the Sinjar region, it abducted at least 5,270
women.4 4 One year later, in 2015, international organizations estimated
that 3,144 women remained slaves.45 Now, these organizations estimate
that throughout ISIL's reign, at least six thousand Yazidi women have spent
some time in bondage.4 6 It is unlikely that the number of enslaved women
will decrease any time soon. In the summer of 2016, ISIL created new
restrictions, forcing women to register in a database.4 7 ISIL uses the
database at checkpoints to stop escaping Yazidi women. 4 8 The number of
successful escapes has gone down to an average of thirty-nine per month,
compared to almost one hundred per month when ISIL first took over.
49
These numbers alone indicate that ISIL has engaged in one of the most
successful mass sexual enslavements of women in the Middle East.
50
ISIL has been successful in its mass enslavement of Yazidi women in
part because of the institutions it has set up to facilitate the enslavement,
including legal institutions. ISIL needed its courts to make rulings and
provide justifications for resurrecting the practice and facilitate the com-
plex questions of owning and trading slaves. First, the courts used ancient
Islamic religious sources to bring back the practice. 5 ' The main justifica-
tion put forward came from an Islamic law that allows fighters to enslave
people who had been defeated in a legal jihad and taken as "spoils of
war."5 2 Spoils of war, the judges clarified, did not refer to all captured
people, but rather just those who could be classified as "Mushrikin"
[pagans], in contrast to "People of the Book."5 3 ISIL courts then ruled that
Yazidis are "Mushrikin" because of their alleged polytheistic beliefs,
although the Yazidis are monotheistic, that the women could be enslaved.
On the other hand, "People of the Book," such as Jews and Christians,
43. See generally U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, "They Came to Destroy": ISIS Crimes
Against the Yazidis, (June 15, 2016), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/
HRCouncil/CoSyria/AHRC 32 CRP.2_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD98-SSNG]; U.S.
HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, "OUR GENERATION Is GONE": THE ISLAMIC STATE'S TARGET-
ING OF IRAQI MINORITIES IN NINEWA 12, https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/Iraq-Bearing-
Witness-Report- 111215.pdf [https://perma.cc/8H9Z-TAZ4].
44. Callimachi, supra note 7.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. ISIS Tightens Grip on Scores of Female Sex Slaves, Bus. INSIDER (July 5, 2016, 4:06
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-is-tightening-its-grip-on-yazidi-women-and-
children-forced-to-become-sex-slaves-2016-7 [https://perma.cc/AYp9-SAJM].
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. SIDDHARTH KARA, SEx TRAFFICKING: INSIDE THE BUSINESS OF MODERN SLAVERY 19
(2009).
51. Slavery in Islam, BBC (Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/
islam/history/slaveryj .shtml [https://perma.cc/ZDW6-D7VD].
52. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, supra note 41, at 154.
53. Richard Spencer, Thousands of Yazidi Women Sold as Sex Slaves "For Theological
Reasons", Says ISIL, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 13, 2013, 1:13 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/islamic-state/ 11158797/Thousands-of-Yazidi-women-sold-as-sex-
slaves-for-theological-reasons-says-Isil.html [https://perma.cc/5JCJ-X5RC].
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could be subject to taxes and other legal punishments, but not enslave-
ment.54 Thereafter, according to ISIL courts, the law boiled down to: a
person who conquers a pagan could take that pagan as a slave because she
is a spoil of war.
5 5
ISIL courts then revamped laws dealing with slave transactions. The
courts drafted and notarized sales contracts for slaves and documents for
willing, disposing of, and freeing a slave. 56 ISIL courts also made specific
prohibitions on the transfer of slaves. Brothers were forbidden to transfer
slaves between one another. 57 And ISIL fighters could not transfer slaves
to non-ISIL fighters, in order to ensure that slaves would remain classified
as "spoils of war."5 8 This hearkens back to the law, which allows only
someone who conquers another person to take that person as a slave.5 9
Since non-ISIL fighters are not involved in the fighting against the Yazidis,
those men fall outside of the parameters of the law. But according to the
United Nations Human Rights Council's Report, ISIL fighters regularly
break these laws because the financial incentives to sell slaves to non-fight-
ers are high.60 Also, ISIL courts created reversion laws to ensure that
slaves were not freed if an owner died intestate. In such cases, slaves revert
to the common ownership of ISIL and can once again be placed on the
market.6 1
Laws also govern when and between whom sex is permitted. Masters
can neither have sexual relations with a pregnant slave, nor with both a
mother and her child, but they can have sex with children in the event that
the child has reached puberty. 62 Fathers and sons cannot share slaves.6 3
The law even instructs slave masters to show "compassion" to slaves,
although this rule is clearly not taken seriously. 64
ISIL has also set up a slave market in order to enhance the business
end of its slave enterprise. The slave trade is run in an efficient and pre-
planned manner in order to ensure profits.65 A set process from capture to
trade exists: When women are first captured, a fleet of pre-arranged buses
takes them to halls, prisons, and other holding areas. 66 These holding
areas are set up in advance with mattresses and other amenities for a cer-
54. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, supra note 43, at 162.
55. Id. at 9 76.
56. Callimachi, supra note 7.
57. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, supra note 43, at 5 75.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 9 76.
60. Id. at 76.
61. Id. at 62.
62. Reuters, ISIL Issues Rules for Sex Slavery in the "Caliphate", THE TELEGRAPH (Dec.
29, 2015, 10:27 PM) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/
12073762/Isil-issues-rules-for-sex-slavery-in-the-caliphate.html [https://perma.cc/7XT3-
3F8R].
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Callimachi, supra note 7, at A12.
66. Id.
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tain number of women. 67 Once ISIL brought the women, it uses a specific
methodology of inventorying and labeling them.68 From the pen, the
women are brought to a slave market to be sold retail or wholesale. The
purchasers are other Muslims who want slaves or people who wish to
purchase the women's freedom. 69 Prices are set as high as $150 and as
low as $25,70 and sometimes, the women are gifted to the commanders. 71
The result is profit and an advertisement tool; images from the market are
used to attract foreign Islamist fighters. 72
Despite this horrific process, some victims have escaped. Two thou-
sand five hundred women are now safe and receiving treatment in
Europe,73 while others have escaped to Kurdish-held territories. 74 Yet the
fear and trauma that ISIL created remains strong. 75 The victims fear not
only that the captors will come to Yazidi safe zones and re-take them as
prisoners, but also that ISIL men will escape punishment. 76 As one Yazidi
escapee remarked, "[tihe day Mosul falls, I fear ISIS men, like the one who
kept me, will just shave off their beards and escape to the West." 77
D. Boko Haram
Boko Haram is a radical Islamist insurgent group that was founded in
2002 by Muhammad Yusuf in Nigeria. 78 Yusuf, like Zarqawi, believed in a
radical form of Islam-so radical that when twelve Northern Nigerian
states voted to institute Sharia law, he protested the action because it was
decided by a democratic vote, which he viewed as a forbidden innovation,
and conducted by a Nigerian government, which he saw as permeated with
corruption. 79 He also sought to take advantage of the tensions that had
plagued Nigeria's religious populations, which is divided between the fifty
percent Christian and forty percent Muslim populations, to inspire the
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id, at Al.
70. Ford Sypher, Rape and Sexual Slavery Inside an ISIS Prison, THE DAILY BEAST
(Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/28/rape-and-sexual-
slavery-inside-an-isis-prison.html [https://perma.cc/SK27-JTBX].
71. Reuters, supra note 62.
72. Callimachi, supra note 7, at A12.
73. Lara Whyte, Germany Opens Its Doors to Yazidi Women and Children Enslaved by
ISIS, THE GuARDIAN (Mar. 2, 2016, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2016/mar/02/germany-opens-doors-yazidi-women-children-northern-iraq-
enslaved-isis [https://perma.cc/24K9-8PXR].
74. Green, supra note 33.
75. Christina Lamb, "They Have Suffered Something so Terrible, Their Eyes Will
Always Haunt You," THE TIMES (Oct. 23, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/
article/they-have-suffered-something-so-terribe-their-eyes-wil-always-haunt-you-
kt3nthm0t [https://perma.cc/N727-4R6Q].
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See VARIN, supra note 8, at 209.
79. J. Peter Pham, Boko Haram's Evolving Threat, Africa Security Brief, AFR. CTR. FOR
STRATEGIC STUD. 2 (Apr. 2012)
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Muslims to form a caliphate.80 But like Jama'at, most people did not look
at Boko Haram's radical stances with favor, and as a result, it was unable to
gather a large following, launching just occasional attacks for about seven
years. 8 1
In 2009, however, Boko Haram launched an insurgency against the
Nigerian government to fulfill its goal of overthrowing the Nigerian govern-
ment and establishing a caliphate.8 2 In 2011, the group launched 196
sophisticated attacks and robbed over one hundred banks for a total of
seven million dollars.8 3 At that time, Boko Haram also stepped up its
attacks against Christians, killing fifty and launching attacks on twenty
churches. 84 Also, just as Jama'at was able to fight and train in Iraq and
Syria, Boko Haram received similar training in Mali.85 When Islamists
seized control of a large part of Mali in 2012, Boko Haram sent its troops
into the battle.86 Its troops thus gained experience for the battle against
the Nigerian government. In 2015, Boko Haram declared its allegiance to
ISIL and renamed itself the Islamic State of West Africa.
8 7
Despite the similarities that Boko Haram shares with ISIL, it has been
unable to replicate its success. In part, this is due to the success of Niger-
ian forces, allied with forces from Chad and Cameroon, in holding off the
terrorist group.88 In 2009, for example, when Boko Haram first began its
sophisticated attacks, the police responded with an operation that killed
Yusuf and more than eight hundred Boko Haram members.8 9 Also, united
African forces have been able to force Boko Haram out of most of its
strongholds, whereas ISIL continues to control Raqqa, Mosul, and other
areas. 90 As a result, Boko Haram has for the most part been constrained to
the Mandara Mountains and the Sambisa Forest, and it has been unable to
expand its support.91
E. Abduction of Women and the Chibok Girls
Boko Haram's campaigns against the Nigerian government have
included the abduction of women and the systematic targeting of
80. Nigeria Demographics, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html [https://perma.cc/S9C3-9CMV].
81. Id.
82. Id. at 4.
83. See VAMN, supra note 8, at 64.
84. Id. at 65.
85. Id. at 71-73.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 3.
88. Id. at 97-112.
89. Id. at 62.
90. Mapping Militant Organizations: Boko Haram, STA. U. (Aug. 26, 2016), http://
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schools. 92 Since 2009, it has abducted about five hundred women, includ-
ing 276 girls in one attack on a school in the town of Chibok in the Borno
State; these girls are known as the "Chibok Girls."'93 But despite Boko
Haram's recent pledge of allegiance to ISIL, its reasons for targeting women
and its subsequent treatment of them do not parallel ISIL's treatment of the
Yazidis.
Whereas ISIL targets the Yazidis because it views the ethnic group as
pagan,94 the reasons behind Boko Haram's targeting of Nigerian women
are far from clear. There are multiple rational reasons that could explain
the targeting, including that the targeted girls have all been schoolchildren,
Christian, or under the auspices of the Nigerian government. I will address
each reason in turn.
The reason that Boko Haram might target girls for being schoolchil-
dren is because one of the group's principle missions is to end Western
education. 95 The name itself, "Boko" [Education] "Haram" [Forbidden] is
meant to denote the fact that the group believes all Western education is
sinful.96 As such, the group has engaged in a systematic targeting of
schools, destroying 211 schools in Borno, twenty-one schools in Yobe, as
well as attacking the Federal Government College and an agricultural col-
lege.97 These attacks have left many men and women dead and under-
mined access to education in Nigeria, where education resources are
already scarce. 98 Boko Haram insurgents believe that Nigerians will stop
sending children to non-Koranic schools if the group succeeds in staging
attacks and abducting women.99 So, perhaps, Boko Haram's goal in
abducting schoolgirls is not to establish a slave market, but rather to force
Nigerians to stop sending children to non-Koranic schools.
Religious affiliation might be another reason why Boko Haram chose
to target the Chibok girls. Chibok is located in Borno State, which has a
large Christian population and accordingly, ninety percent of the Chibok
Girls were Christian.' 00 Furthermore, when Boko Haram abducted the
girls, its militants separated Christians from Muslims and gave the Chris-
tians a choice of converting to Islam or facing conditions of domestic servi-
tude, whereas the militants allowed most Muslim abductees to leave. 1 1
This reason would fit well with Boko Haram's goal of establishing a cali-
phate and inflaming tensions between Christians and Muslims.
92. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "THOSE TERRIBLE WEEKS IN THEIR CAMP": BOKO HARAM VIO-
LENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA 1 (2014), https://www.hrw.org/
report/20 14/ 10/27/those-terrible-weeks-their-camp/boko-haram-violence-against-
women-and-girls [https://perma.cc/77AV-72V3].
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A final reason why Boko Haram might be targeting women is simply to
get back at the Nigerian government, which had engaged in a campaign of
targeting the wives of Boko Haram leaders. 10 2 This reason is also plausible
because Boko Haram sees itself at war with an illegitimate Nigerian state
and would want to hurt the government as the government had hurt the
group. Any of these reasons could be behind Boko Haram's attacks.
Boko Haram does not treat the Nigerian abductees the way ISIL treats
the Yazidis either. Although Boko Haram leaders stated that the girls
would be sold as slaves at the time of abduction, the word "slave" does not
seem to have the same connotation as in the case of the Yazidis.' 0 3 Nor
has Boko Haram revamped laws to facilitate enslavement as ISIL did.
10 4
Boko Haram forced most of the Nigerian abductees to do manual labor
such as cook, clean, and perform other household chores, 10 5 whereas the
emphasis on sexual relations was not as prevalent. 10 6 This is not to say
that sexual assault does not occur; credible rape cases are documented and
forced marriages are prevalent, but there is no evidence that such cases are
widespread. The Human Rights Watch report on Boko Haram points out
that the "commanders appeared to make some effort to protect women
from sexual assault" before entering forced marriages. 10 7
The possible reasons for the disparate treatment are multifold. Per-
haps it is because the Nigerian abductees are mostly Christian and thus
still "People of the Book." Perhaps it is because ISIL, seeing itself more as a
global empire, needs an effective advertising tool to recruit foreign fighters
into its ranks, whereas Boko Haram for the most part is limited to Nigeria
and the general area of West Africa. 10 8 Alternatively, it could be the case
because Boko Haram wants to create institutions for enslavement, but it
has not been able to retain sufficient power over territories as ISIL has.
Boko Haram might fear that the creation of true slave markets could trigger
too large of a reprisal from African forces, just as the greatest reprisal
against Boko Haram so far was after the abduction of the Chibok girls.
These discrepancies and their effect on the prosecution of Boko Haram will
be further discussed in Part IV.
II. Rwandan and Yugoslavian Genocides
A. Rape in the Bosnian Genocide
The Bosnian Genocide occurred during the Yugoslav Wars of the
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Young Girls in North-East Nigeria, CONLICT TRENDS, Jan. 2014, at 52.
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1990s.10 9 Yugoslavia had been a multi-ethnic federation composed of
Slovenes, Croats, Serbians, Bosnians, Albanians, Macedonians, and
others." 0 Despite these tremendous ethnic differences, the state had been
held together in large part due to Yugoslavia's dictator, Josip Broz Tito. n '
When Tito died in 1980, tensions between the ethnic groups escalated, in
particular as Yugoslavia faced an economic crisis. 112 As the state fell
apart, Serbian nationalists, such as Slobodan Milosevic, stepped into
power.'13 These nationalists capitalized on the fear and growing xenopho-
bia until hostilities between the former republics broke out.1 14
When total war erupted between the Bosnian Muslims and the Serbs,
the rape of Bosnian Muslim women followed." 5 Much like with ISIL, the
Serbian rape of the Bosnian Muslim "other" did not just occur as a result of
random events, but rather as a planned campaign. In most cases, Serbian
soldiers would take over a town and then kill the men, such as in Srebren-
ica. 116 After the slaughter, the Serbs would take the women onto buses
and transport them to concentration camps and other holding facilities,
which were set up in advance." 7 Sometimes the rape began before women
even reached the camps." 8 Testimonies of Bosnian Muslim women
revealed that Serbian soldiers would stop the buses at checkpoints and pull
the most attractive women off the buses for roadside rape.1 19 Once the
buses reached the camps, few were spared.120 Some of these camps, such
as Fota and Buk Bijela, were created for the explicit purpose of providing a
forum for Serbian soldiers to commit sexual assault. 12 1 And the rape
occurred not just at the rape camps, but also at Omarska, Tmopolje, and
other camps, as well as in private homes, apartments, sports halls, and
schools. 12 2
Testimonies from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) revealed gruesome scenes. According to witnesses, the
rich and educated women were raped first. 12 3 Gang-rapes, sexual assaults,
and rapes through means of objects occurred, and some victims were even
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sold off to Serbian soldiers. 12 4 In buildings where women were held, Serbs
had "unfettered" access to the halls where they were located;1 25 the soldiers
could choose whomever to assault, and sometimes the commanders would
order them to do so. 12 6 Judge Florence Mumba, one of the presiding
judges, described the defendants' actions in Kunarac as a "nightmarish
scheme of sexual exploitation."'
12 7
During the rapes, the rapists would reveal the purposes behind their
campaign of sexual assault. 12 8 Victims testified that the soldiers would
accuse them of being Ustashi or Turks. 129 Victims also testified that the
Serbian soldiers wanted to inseminate the women with Serbian seed in
order to eliminate the Muslim nation. 130 This insemination idea caught on
among the Serbian soldiers because there was a belief that religion passed
through the father. 13 1 When the violence came to an end, the European
Union estimated that 20,000 women had been raped, whereas the Bosnian
sources estimated that the number of women having been raped was closer
to 50,000.132 As Samantha Power, the former United States Ambassador to
the United Nations wrote:
They [Serbs] forced fathers to castrate their sons or molest their daughters;
they humiliated and raped (often impregnating) young women. Theirs
[Serbs] was a deliberate policy of destruction and degradation: destruction
so this avowed enemy race [Bosnian Muslims] would have no homes to
which to return; degradation so the former inhabitants would not stand
tall-and thus would not dare again stand-in Serb-held territory.
133
The ICTY was precedent-setting with respect to rape because three
criminals, Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac, and Zoran Vukovic, became
the first to be tried for rape as a crime against humanity under Article 5(g)
of the Tribunal.' 3 4 The court found that the Serbs had engaged in a sys-
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tematic attack against the Bosnian Muslims; that the Serbs attacked Mus-
lims for no reason other than their ethnic identities; that Bosnian Muslims
were not armed, scared to sleep in their homes, and forced to flee; and that
the Muslims were subject to long periods of imprisonment which included
brutal beatings and rape. 135 Furthermore, soldiers such as Kunarac had
taken advantage of their access to the Partizan Sports Hall and Kalinovik
Primary School,13 6 where women were coerced and assaulted.13 7 ICTY
convicted all three defendants for using rape as a crime against human-
ity. 1 38 Although the verdict was not genocide, Powers wrote "such crimes
constituted crimes against humanity and might well be considered geno-
cide under the convention."' 39
B. The Rwandan Genocide
The background of the Rwandan Genocide can be traced to the begin-
ning of the 1900s, when the Europeans engaged in the "Scramble for
Africa."' 40 As a result of that campaign, Belgium colonized Rwanda. 14 1
Upon the Belgians' arrival, Rwanda had three main ethnic groups, which
included the "Hutus" and "Tutsis."'14 2 For centuries, the differences
between the groups hinged on the Hutus being farmers and of lower class
and the Tutsis being pastoralists and of higher class. 14 3 This distinction
was not fixed: a Hutu could become a Tutsi. 14 4 But the Belgians changed
this definition and incorporated anthropological sciences of the time: Tut-
sis were re-classified as a superior group on the basis of racial characteris-
tics, such as light-skin, whereas Hutus were seen as inferior because of
their dark skin and short stature. 145 As such, the Belgians gave the Tutsis
control of the government. 146
The Hutus refused to accept this arrangement and revolted in 1959,
expelling 300,000 Tutsis to neighboring countries. 147 The former Tutsis
re-settled, for the most part, in Uganda where they formed a resistance
group known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). 14 8 In 1990, the RPF
attacked Rwanda from Southern Uganda, 149 which led to the beginning of
a war that lasted until 1993, when the fighting groups signed the Arusha
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Accords.' 5 0 But the peace did not last; in 1994, the plane of Rwanda's
Hutu President Juvenal Habyarimana was shot down and hostilities
resumed. 151
Rape followed the outbreak of hostilities, just like in the former Yugo-
slavia. Tutsi women were subjected to gang rape, torture, and rape through
means of an external object. 15 2 The Hutus even forced some women into
quasi-enslavement, in the form of forced marriage, where realities were
similar to slave conditions.' 53 Testimonies from the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal on Rwanda (ICTR) revealed that the rapists made statements
during intercourse, which evoked pre-war anti-Tutsi propaganda, such as,
"We want to see if a Tutsi woman is like a Hutu woman."' 54 One survivor,
for example, testified that when a Hutu raped her, the rapist told her that
the Hutus did not want to kill all the Tutsi women on the spot, but rather to
let them die of grief. 155 When the violence came to an end, experts esti-
mated that Hutus had raped between 250,000 and 500,000 Tutsi women
during just one hundred days.' 5 6 Rene Degni-Segui, the Special Rap-
porteur on Rwanda, stated in his report to the United Nations that, "rape
was the rule and its absence the exception."' 57 The ICTR, like the ICTY,
also set legal precedent for rape. But this time it was with the first convic-
tion for rape under the Article 2 of the Genocide Convention.' 5 8 The
defendant, Jean-Paul Akayesu had been a leader of Taba, a Rwandan com-
mune. 159 The court found that Akayesu knew of the sexual assaults that
occurred in his commune; that he provided tacit encouragement to the rap-
ists; and that he did so as part of the systematic attack on the Tutsi peo-
plel 6° And then, in a departure from the ICTY proceedings, the court
accepted the argument of the chief prosecutor, Pierre Prosper, that
Akayesu's actions and inactions amounted to genocide.' 6' Prosper's argu-
ment will be recounted in the next section. As such, ICTR judged
Akayesu's attack to be part and parcel of the Hutu attempt to destroy the
Tutsi.' 6 2 This ruling set historical precedent for the prosecution of rape as
genocide.
150. MOGHALU, supra note 140 at 14-15.
151. Id. at 16.
152. See generally Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2,
1998), http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-4/trial-
judgements/en/980902.pdf [https://perma.cc/XRY7-QGMU].
153. The Genocide, FOUND. RWANDA, http://www.foundationrwanda.org/thegenocide.
aspx (last visited May 12, 2017) [https://perma.cc/8E9L-SLGL].
154. MOGHALU, supra note 140, at 18.
155. Id. at 35.
156. FERGUSON, supra note 132.
157. U.N. Commission on Hum. Rts., Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
Rwanda Submitted by Mr. Rene Degni-Segui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Hum. Rts., 20, E/CN.4/1996/68 (Jan. 29, 1996).
158. See generally Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment.
159. Id. at 1 54.
160. Id. at 706.
161. PowER, supra note 116, at 485.
162. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, at 169.
Cornell International Law Journal
111. The Genocide Convention
A. Law of Rape
The International Criminal Court has adopted the Rome Statute's ele-
ments of rape as a crime against humanity in Article 7(1)(g)-1 to establish
the actus rea and mens rea of the physical act of rape. So prior to looking at
elements of Article 2 of the Genocide Convention, the Rome Statute's ele-
ments for Article 7(1)(g)-1 must be met, which state:
1. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in
penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of
the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of
the victim with any object or any other part of the body.
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion,
such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological
oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or
by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was com-
mitted against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against a civilian population.
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the con-
duct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a
civilian population. 163
There are some notable aspects of the statute that have departed from
some of the case law, which are worth mentioning before proceeding to the
application. With respect to § 1, the statute specifically calls for "penetra-
tion, however slight" of the victim. This is different from the ICTR's deci-
sion in Akayesu, which stated that "elements of the crime of rape cannot be
captured in a mechanical description of objects and body parts."164 There-
fore, § 1 is a more difficult burden for the prosecutor to prove than in some
of the previous cases, although the Court in Bemba clarified that the pene-
tration can be oral, in addition to anal or vaginal. 165
With respect to § 2, the former half of the statute allows for determin-
ing non-consent in individual circumstances, whereas the latter half allows
the court to infer non-consent from the existence of a "coercive environ-
ment." These separate inquiries are the results of a split in the ICTY and
ICTR case laws as well. 166 In Akayesu, Musema, and Niyitegeka at the ICTR
and Kunarac at the ICTY, the tribunals looked only at the inherent coercive
conditions of time, not individual consent. 16 7 But in Semanza, the tribunal
looked to non-consent in individual circumstances. 16 8 Later, in Gacum-
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lyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BUG6-6F8L].
164. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 597.
165. Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment, cl 100, 101 (Mar.
21, 2016).
166. Catherine MacKinnon, Defining Rape Internationally: A Comment on Akayesu, 44
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 940, 943 (2005-2006).
167. Id. at 950.
168. Id.
Vol. 50
2017 Rape in War
bitsi, the ICTR sided with Akayesu and inferred non-consent through "coer-
cive conditions."1 69 And in March 2016, in Bemba, the ICC said that it
interpreted this part of the statute in light of Akayesu. 1 70 Therefore, the
ICC will most likely continue interpreting § 2 under Akayesu, and individ-
ual consent will not need to be proven if a "coercive environment"
exists.1 71
§ 3 and § 4 have not been subject to the same split case law as the
other two sections of the statute, and thus can be applied as is.
Article VI of the Rome Statute provides that:
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, as
such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 172
A person who rapes with the specific intent to destroy a people can be
convicted under Article 2 (b), (c), or (d). 173 What it means to "destroy" an
ethnic group is not clear from the statute, but Chief Prosecutor Pierre Pros-
per's argument in Akayesu sheds light on how the court applies this prong.
At the ICTR, Prosper argued that a group could remain physically intact,
but be left so "marginalized or so irrelevant to society that it would, in
effect, be destroyed."'1 74 It would thus seem that Prosper's argument is a
qualitative and quantitative question of how and how much the victimized
group can continue to contribute to societies and cultures around it after it
has been attacked. Assuming that future international tribunals accept
this rationale as precedent, it can be useful in assessing whether ISIL and
Boko Haram militants have sought to destroy their victims.
Article VII of the Rome Statute defines "Crimes Against Humanity" as
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or sys-
tematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of
the attack:
(a) Murder:
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
169. Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Judgment, 148 (July 7,
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(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in viola-
tion of fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of compa-
rable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in para-
graph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as imper-
missible under international law, in connection with any act referred
to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical
health. 17
5
In the comments, the Statute clarifies a few somewhat ambiguous
points that might be of consequence to the discussion in this paper,
including:
(a) "Attack directed against any civilian population" means a course
of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to
in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such
attack;
(b) "Enslavement" means the exercise of any or all of the powers
attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes
the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons,
in particular women and children;
(c) "Persecution" means the intentional and severe deprivation of
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the
identity of the group or collectivity. 176
At the outset, it is important to note the difference between genocide
and crimes against humanity. According to Professor Philippe Sands, the
difference between the two crimes is not related to the scale of the crime,
but rather the intention behind its perpetration. 177 Whereas the genocide
prong of the Rome Statute is meant to protect groups against destruction,
crimes against humanity focuses on the systematic killing of a large num-
ber of individuals.178 As such, the difference between the two crimes boils
down to whether a group or collective have been targeted as opposed to
individual civilians. Nevertheless, these crimes often overlap and are
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charged at the same time, as was the case in Akayesu.17 9
B. Application of the Rome Statute
In the case of ISIL, the ICC should prosecute major ISIL leaders, such
as al-Baghdadi, for rape under Article 2(b) of the Genocide Convention.
Prosecutors must first make sure that these leaders are liable for the physi-
cal act of rape under Article 7(1)(g)-1 of the Rome Statute. Under 7(1)(g)-
1, the courts should be able to establish each element.
With respect to § 1, evidence of physical invasion of a victim, Yazidi
survivors have testified about their experiences to Human Rights
Watch, 180 in front of Congress,' 8 ' in front of the United Nations,' 8 2 and to
various other institutions. 1 8 3 Also, hundreds of Yazidis are being treated in
Europe for physical and mental ailments, some of whom might be open to
coming to court. 184 The ICTR in Akayesu convicted the defendant based
on testimonies from twenty seven witnesses, and a comparable amount of
Yazidis most likely would be willing to come forward.18 5 Also, despite the
higher burden on the prosecutor to establish "penetration," there should be
no issue here because ISIL's purpose in enslaving the Yazidi women was to
engage in sexual gratification.' 8 6 Other humiliating acts, such as those
that occurred in Rwanda, which might have been difficult to fit under "pen-
etration," do not seem to be as present with ISIL, if at all.
With respect to § 2, coercion of the individual or coercive environ-
ment, the Court can find a coercive environment in the facts that ISIL sold
women on a market and subjected them to a registration system, and their
widespread slaughter of Yazidi men. In Kunarac, consent was vitiated on
the basis of brothel-like conditions in which Serbian soldiers had "unfet-
tered" access to the rooms of Bosnian women in the Partizan Sports Hall
and Kalinovik School. 18 7 In Gacumbitsi, the Court established that defen-
dant's utterances that women should be killed in the case of resistance also
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vitiated consent.' 8 8 Here, ISIL slave owners have full power over their
slaves and can subject them to abuse and prevent them from leaving the
home. 18 9 But it is important to note that if the Court reverts to Semanza, it
could get caught in a back-and-forth over each rape and whether there was
individual consent. This does not seem likely, though, because that stan-
dard is illogical, and neither Gacumbitsi nor Bemba adopted it.190
With respect to § 3, conduct committed as part of systematic and
widespread attack, the Court will find ample evidence. First, seven mass
graves of Yazidis have been found. 19 1 Second, out of all the minorities who
lived in the Nineveh province, where Sinjar is located, before the war,
almost none remains. 192 And the attack on the Yazidis bears similarities to
the events that occurred in Bosnia and Rwanda. Like the Bosnian Muslims,
the Yazidis were not armed when attacked; thousands of Yazidis fled out of
their fear of remaining in their homes; and then the Yazidis suffered a wide
pattern of abuse, including murder and sexual enslavement. 193 Also, like
the Rwandan Tutsis, the Yazidis were the sole group targeted for mass kill-
ing and rape, despite ISIL attacking other minorities, such as Christians,
Turkmen, Shabak, Sabaean-Mandaean, and Kaka'i people. 194 The Report
of the Holocaust Memorial Museum singles out only the Yazidis as victims
of genocide. 195
With respect to § 4, knowledge of the systematic attack, ISIL leaders
will be unable to plead ignorance given the range of attacks and institu-
tions set up to make the enslavement successful, as was recounted in the
Part II.
C. Application of the Genocide Convention
With the physical elements of rape established, the Court can proceed
to the more difficult claim-that the rape of the Yazidis constituted a geno-
cide. The Court should find that at least some ISIL leaders had the general
intent to cause serious bodily suffering and mental harm to the Yazidi peo-
ple under Article 2(b) of the Genocide Convention through the use of rape
and the specific intent to destroy the Yazidi people, in whole or in part,
through such rape.
To establish ISIL's general intent to cause suffering and serious bodily
harm to the Yazidis, the Court can look to multiple facts. First, the mili-
tants gave the Yazidis a choice to convert to Islam rather than be subjected
to bondage, which indicates that ISIL wanted to impose suffering as pun-
ishment for refusing conversion. 19 6 Second, the sexual violence in and of
188. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Judgment, at ' 48.
189. Id. 1 148, 1 155.
190. Shaheen, supra note 40.
191. U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAl MUSEUM, supra note 43, at 21.
192. Id.
193. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, 571-74.
194. See U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, supra note 43 at 18, 20-21.
195. See id. at 20-21.
196. See id. at 16.
Vol. 50
2017 Rape in War
itself constitutes the commission of serious bodily and mental harm.197
Third, although ISIL attacked other groups, the sole group that they
targeted for widespread murder and sexual enslavement-on the basis of
their identity-was the Yazidis. 198 And lastly, in the instances where ISIL
did not enslave the Yazidi women, they killed them along with the Yazidi
men.199 Therefore, the Court should find that a general intent to cause
serious bodily and mental harm to the Yazidis existed.
When establishing ISIL's specific intent to cause the destruction of the
Yazidis in whole or in part, the Court can look into numerous facts about
ISIL's actions. The Court can see ISIL's motives in some of its own publica-
tions in Dabiq, its English language magazine. In Dabiq, ISIL stated that
the Yazidis' polytheistic religion could not exist along-side ISIL."20 0 Also,
evidence exists that ISIL researched the Yazidis before its attack on Sinjar
and concluded that the Yazidis had to be killed or converted, in contrast to
Christians and Jews who could continue to practice their religions.2 0 1
The Court can then look to the Yazidis and ask whether the Yazidi
women can contribute to their surrounding cultures or societies. There is
little doubt that Yazidis under ISIL rule have no such power of contribu-
tion. ISIL subjects the women to the absolute will of their masters, making
them unable to leave their homes or see their families. 20 2 The sole reason
for their existence, in the eyes of their captors, is to provide sexual gratifica-
tion to their owners. And it is important-if not crucial-to note that had
ISIL not taken the Yazidi women for sexual gratification, ISIL would proba-
bly have killed them along with the Yazidi men. In fact, the mass graves
hold both the bodies of men and women and at least one grave has been
discovered, which holds older women, presumably those who were not fit
for enslavement.20 3 Like the Rwandan Tutsis, life for Yazidi women has
devolved into simple torture, and ISIL kills those whom it does not see as
fit for torture. Therefore, given that Yazidi women face either death or sex-
ual enslavement, the Court should find that ISIL intended the Yazidis'
destruction.
- The last task of the court is to determine whether the genocide was
perpetrated against the Yazidis "in whole or in part." As we saw in Srebren-
ica, localized genocide is possible; not all the members of a group need to
die or be raped for it to be considered a genocide. 20 4 Under this prong, the
Court should have few problems establishing a localized genocide.
Thousands of women remain enslaved and unable to live meaningful
lives.20 5 The quantitative problem that we will see with Boko Haram is not
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present here. Therefore, the Court should find that ISIL's rape of the Yazidi
women constitutes a genocide.
The ICC will most likely charge ISIL militants for non-genocidal
crimes as well under Article VII of the Rome Statute. For example, suffi-
cient evidence exists to bring other charges against ISIL for sexual crimes,
including crimes against humanity for rape under Article 7(1)(g)-1, sexual
slavery under Article 7(1)(g)-2, sexual violence under Article 7(1)(g)-6,
other inhumane acts under Article 7(1)(k), and various War Crimes under
Article VIII. These charges can be brought against ISIL militants in con-
junction with-or as an alternative to-charging genocide, because the rape
of the Yazidis occurred as a widespread and systematic attack against their
ethnic group. As I discussed above, ISIL researched the Yazidis before the
attack began, then targeted the group in a series of mass murders, and
enslaved Yazidi women at each step.20 6 The Yazidis were, and remain, a
civilian population that did not threaten the surrounding Islamic popula-
tion. ISIL forced the Yazidis to undergo multiple attacks, and stripped their
freedom. Therefore, if the ICC does not bring genocide claim, then they
should find ISIL guilty of crimes against humanity.
D. Application to Boko Haram
In the case of Boko Haram, the ICC will not be able to prosecute its
major leaders for rape under Article VI of the Rome Statute. Although at
least some Boko Haram leaders might have overseen incidents of rape or
perpetrated sexual assault themselves, the Court will find little evidence
that Boko Haram committed the attacks with the intent of destroying, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.
With respect to the question of whether Boko Haram has targeted a
specific group, the answer is not clear because Boko Haram has communi-
cated multiple different messages. As I discussed in the section on Boko
Haram's background, it is not clear whether the group is targeting school-
children, government supporters, or Christians. The former two groups do
not work under Article VI because neither is a national, ethnic, racial, or
religious group under the statute. Targeting Christians would work, but
the evidence is unclear as to whether that is happening. Although Boko
Haram has attacked Christian sites and killed Christians in a handful of
incidents, and there are tensions between Muslims and Christians in Nige-
ria, there is also evidence that the group has attacked and killed non-Chris-
tians, including Muslims who support the Nigerian government. 20 7 The
separation of Christians from Muslims in the case of the Chibok girls is
just one incident in six years, rather than a widespread and systematic
attack. Therefore, no conclusive evidence that Christians are the specific
group that Boko Haram is after exists.
And even if the court could establish that Boko Haram was just after
Christians, it would run into the "in whole or in part" prong of the statute.
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As I mentioned, the ICTY recognized the possibility of localized genocide
with its convictions against Serbian war criminals for the killing of eight
thousand Muslims in Srebrenica.20 8 But the ICTY left open the question of
how localized is too localized; in other words, the issue is still open as to
whether a genocide can be too small. Is the kidnapping of about three
hundred Nigerian schoolchildren enough? On the one hand, at least some
of these girls have been forced into marriages similar to those that made up
the genocide claims in Gacumbitsi.20 9 Also, it might be unconscionable to
tell someone who suffered through such a horror that the event is not geno-
cide just because the group of targeted people was not large enough. 2 10
On the other hand, the Court would be dealing with quite a small group of
people-just a fraction of the number of people killed at Srebrenica. Fur-
ther precedent is thus needed, but the Court seems unwilling to allow the
definition of genocide to be stretched this far.
Lastly, the Court would not satisfy the last and most difficult prong of
the statute-the specific intent to destroy a people. Boko Haram, like ISIL,
is not against the existence of Christians. 2 11 While it does subject Chris-
tians to taxes and other humiliating laws, it does not force them to convert
or face either murder or enslavement as ISIL does with the Yazidis. 2 12 In
other words, ISIL prevents Yazidis from being Yazidi, whereas Boko Haram
only makes Christians face roadblocks to practicing their religion, not an
outright prohibition. Therefore, although at least some Boko Haram mem-
bers have raped or assaulted at least some of the Nigerian abductees, a
genocidal rape claim against Boko Haram will fail.
Nevertheless, the fact that a prosecutor against Boko Haram could not
win on a genocide claim does not mean that Boko Haram should not be
prosecuted. Rather, Boko Haram can be indicted under either the same
crimes against humanity in Article VII of the Rome Statute or general war
crimes under Article VIII as ISIL. Boko Haram militants could be charged
under the enslavement (c), forcible transfer of population (d), rape (g), and
other inhumane acts (k) prongs of the crimes against humanity Article of
the Rome Statute. But the ICC most likely will not charge the militants
under torture (f) because Bemba ruled that rape subsumed the allegations
of torture.21 3 The crimes against humanity prong of the Rome Statute
would work in the case of Boko Haram because such a prong allows a
charge to be brought against a group that engages in a widespread and
systemic attack against any civilian population. Therefore, the problem of
deciding who Boko Haram is targeting, whether its Christians, schoolchil-
dren, or those under the auspices of the Nigerian government, does not
affect such a charge as it would with genocide. Furthermore, given that
208. BROUWER, supra note 130, at 75.
209. Id. at 54.
210. See Menachem Rosensaft, The Srebrenica Massacre Must be Recognized as a Geno-
cide, HUFFINGTON POST (July 15, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/menachem-
rosensaft/the-srebrenica-massacre-m b_7805728.html [https://perma.cc/6DJN-345M].
211. See VARIN, supra note 8, at 85-87.
212. U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, supra note 43, at 21.
213. Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment, 204-05.
Cornell International Law Journal
Boko Haram engaged in an insurgent effort for almost a decade, there
would be sufficient proof to show that multiple and systematic attacks
occurred against civilians.
IV. Who Should the ICC Charge?
A. Islamic State Militants
Perhaps the most important question that ICC prosecutors must deal
with is who to charge for using rape as a weapon of war. This question
presents particular difficulties for ISIL as a terrorist organization because
some of its main leaders remain unknown or are classified for security rea-
sons.2 14 Nevertheless, at least some current information can be used to
pinpoint specific ISIL militants who have had a large role in facilitating the
enslavement, including Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Turki al-Binali, and Abu
Mohammed al-Ani. This list is not exhaustive, but still helps provide a
starting point for the prosecution against ISIL.
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became the head of the Islamic State after the
death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. 2 15 He was born in 1971 to a religious
Sunni Muslim family in Iraq. 216 Little credible information about his time
as an adolescent exists; however, at some point, he earned a degree in
Islamic Studies from the Islamic University in Baghdad, served as an
Islamic preacher, and formed a small terrorist organization that never
gained prominence. 2 17 In 2005, al-Baghdadi became better known to
American forces when he was captured in Iraq and interned at the Bucca
detention camp for four years.2 18 At the prison, Baghdadi was deemed a
model inmate and not a significant threat.2 19 But prison changed him.2 20
Bucca brought Sunni extremists and other Muslims together, providing a
space for indoctrination. 2 2 1 One inmate wrote, "Bucca was a factory. It
made us all. It built our ideology. '2 22 So in 2010, after being released
from prison, the new extremist al-Baghdadi took over the Islamic State in
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Iraq, which al-Qaeda still controlled at the time.2 23
Baghdadi has now been in charge of ISIL for the last seven years.
224
He has been responsible for-and retains absolute power over-the group's
institutional structure, appointing governors, ministers, and judges.225 In
that vein, he has also had the final word on the legal and business institu-
tions created to facilitate the enslavement of the Yazidi women.226 As such,
al-Baghdadi's power is similar to the defendant in Akayesu who, as
bourgmestre (mayor) of the Taba commune, had ultimate authority over an
area in which sexual assault was perpetrated. Furthermore, there is at least
some evidence that al-Baghdadi himself raped women who he took as
slaves, including American hostage Kayla Mueller. 227 There should be no
issue prosecuting al-Baghdadi for genocidal rape and other crimes.
Turki al-Binali is ISIL's chief religious advisor, also known as the
Grand Mufti.2 28 Al-Binali was born in Bahrain, and he studied at Dubai's
Islamic and Arabic Studies College and later at other Islamic universi-
ties. 229 After he joined ISIL in 2013, the terrorist organization made al-
Binali the head of its Research and Fatwa Department.2 30 In that role, he
published pamphlets that provided ISIL with justification for enslaving and
raping Yazidi women.231 The same department also issued a pamphlet
titled "Questions and Answers on Taking Captives."'232 Many consider Al-
Binali as one of the up-and-coming leaders of ISIL. 233 Likewise, Abu
Mohammed al-Ani is the head of the Islamic State's Judicial Authority,
which deals with all judicial matters. 234 As was discussed in Section II,
ISIL's courts have also been instrumental in providing the legal rules gov-
erning the personal and business interactions between masters and slaves.
As such, given al-Ani's position as head of the authority, an international
tribunal can infer his power over, and direct involvement in, enforcing laws
against the Yazidis. There is no evidence that either al-Binali or al-Am have
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raped Yazidis themselves, but that should not stop the prosecution given
the essential role that both have had in facilitating the enslavement.
But prosecuting both judicial officers could raise an interesting ques-
tion that has not been seen since the Nazi Judges' trial: if judges only
enforce the law of a despotic regime, in particular when that regime threat-
ens all people who engage in non-compliance, should international tribu-
nals prosecute those judges? At the Judges' Trial, twelve former Nazi
judges were charged and convicted with "judicial murder and other atroci-
ties ... and then utilizing the emptied forms of legal process for the perse-
cution, enslavement and extermination on a large scale. '23 5 But the
distinction between the Nazi Judges' Trial and what could become the trial
of former ISIL judges is that the Nazis did not discipline any judges for not
towing the Nazi line, whereas ISIL has killed or tortured judges for rulings
seen as inappropriate. 2 36 Therefore, whether it is permissible to discipline
ISIL judges who act under at least some compulsion for enforcing brutal
laws will be a new question for the international tribunals to decide.
B. Boko Haram Militants
Abubakar Shekau was born in northeast Nigeria about forty years
ago. 23 7 He has been the head of Boko Haram since 2009, when Moham-
med Yusuf was killed. 238 Like the other militants, little is known about
Shekau's life, but those in Nigeria who are familiar with him have
described Shekau as ruthless, crazy, and a sadist.23 9 After the abduction of
the Chibok girls, Boko Haram released a video in which Shekau claimed to
be responsible for the abduction of the girls and threatened to sell the girls
on the market. 24° He has also been responsible for attacks in Nigeria that
do not involve the abduction and rape of girls. 24 1 Therefore, he should be
brought to justice in the event that the ICC brings charges against Boko
Haram for using rape as a weapon of war.
Conclusion
The last three decades have been a mixed bag for the international
courts concerning trials on rape. On the one hand, the ICTY, ICTR and
ICC prosecutions of rape have been a resounding triumph. For the first
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time in human history, men and women have been indicted and convicted
under the Genocide Convention and Rome Statute for raping or overseeing
the rape of women during times of war. Justice has been achieved for at
least some women. But on the other hand, there have been just twenty-nine
convictions, while even the most conservative estimates of the number of
raped women would range into the low hundreds of thousands. Neverthe-
less, the ICC is still in its outset and limited in its police powers to bring
war criminals to justice; and admittedly, many war criminals have been
prosecuted in local courts. Yet, the number of convictions for rape as a
weapon of war is still far too low.
As Iraqi troops encircle Mosul and other successes against ISIL occur,
the ICC has the chance to bring ISIL leaders to justice for using rape
against the Yazidi people as a weapon of genocide and as crimes against
humanity. 24 2 ISIL leaders have engaged in or supported the rape of the
Yazidis, had the general intent to cause serious bodily or mental harm to
the Yazidis through the use of rape, and had the specific intent to destroy
the Yazidis. Furthermore, ISIL militants have engaged in the forcible trans-
fer, sexual enslavement, and torture of Yazidi civilians.
In regards to Boko Haram, the ICC will also have the chance to bring
its leaders to justice, but not under the genocide convention. Boko Haram
has not targeted one of the specific groups enumerated in the genocide
convention, its localized actions are too small to be considered a genocide,
and it did not have the specific intent to inflict destruction on a group.
Boko Haram can still be prosecuted; the terrorist group still committed
rape, torture, sexual enslavement, and the forcible transfer of civilians.
Therefore, the ICC should still prosecute Boko Haram leaders under the
Article VII and Article VIII of the Rome Statute.
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